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Writer's picturePeripheral Histories ISSN 2755-368X

Breaking out of the Baltic Periphery?: The Global Ambitions of the Duchy of Courland in the Seventeenth Century

Updated: 43 minutes ago

John Freeman


The early modern eastern Baltic Sea has often been considered, with some criticism, a global periphery in comparison to the oceanic ‘core’. Nevertheless, a handful of eastern Baltic territories did strive for a direct role in early modern Atlantic colonisation. Among them was the Duchy of Courland, located in today’s Latvian regions of Kurzeme and Zemgale. Ducal expeditions famously constructed fortresses on the River Gambia at St Andreas Island (now Kunta Kinteh Island, The Gambia) in 1651, and on the Caribbean island of Tobago in 1654. Following the Swedish invasion of Courland between 1658 and 1660, both fortresses were seized by the English Royal African Company (RAC) and Dutch West India Company (WIC) respectively, but Courlanders persisted in trying to colonise Tobago until the turn of the century.



Map of the Duchy of Courland in the Seventeenth Century

 

Reorientation from the Baltic Periphery


Courland is a fascinating case of attempted reorientation. The duchy was arguably peripheral even within the Baltic itself. A vassal of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, wedged against the expansionist Swedish Empire and Russia, it was the stage for frequent battles between the three states, causing political instability and famine. Its frontiers skirted around Riga, by far the major port in the eastern Baltic region, which forced it to rely on the much smaller ports of Windau (Latvian: Ventspils) and Libau (Liepāja). The political structure was also oriented towards preserving the privileges of  the nobility over the duke and the towns. Any steps perceived as strengthening ducal power could be met by severe penalties from Warsaw, as co-Duke Wilhelm found when he was exiled in 1617.


The disadvantageous situation encouraged the dukes to look outwardly to increase their prestige. In some cases, this entailed offering services to contacts abroad. For example, James I of England paid Wilhelm a pension for providing information on Baltic conflicts. Later, his son, Duke Jakob, offered weapons to the Royalist cause during the English Civil War.[1] The duchy also declared itself neutral which gave it a distinct identity, to the extent that Courland acted as a mediator between the Commonwealth and Sweden at peace negotiations in 1651. The attempt to de-peripheralise the duchy eventually encouraged global thinking in a bid to further increase export potential, an initiative facilitated by a new merchant fleet and extended commercial network.

 


Shipbuilding in Windau drawn by Johann Streck, mid-seventeenth Century. Latvijas Valsts Vēstures Arhīvs, Riga (LVVA): 554, apr. 1, l. 850d, fols. 6-7.


Creating Atlantic Courland


Courland’s trans-Atlantic colonial venture is most closely associated with Duke Jakob Kettler (reigned 1642–1682) due to his intimate personal involvement with the scheme and its conception. Images of Jakob sometimes portray him in front of a map showing the route from Courland across the Atlantic in order to illustrate his economic ambition. However, fixating on Jakob, as well as visualising Tobago and Gambia as mere points of a trade triangle, does not truly encapsulate how global Courland’s aspirations were or the web of foreign entanglements they entailed.



Duke Jakob Kettler and the Atlantic depicted (above) in a commemorative stamp from 2001 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)


The process for boosting the prestige of the Kettler family involved various associations which connected the duchy to larger networks. Investigating the personnel of the voyages reveals how both regional and colonial communities of expertise were utilised. The need for knowledge about Western African markets and customs encouraged recruitment of former employees of the WIC, as well as Portuguese-speakers in acknowledgement of the important role of the Luso-African diaspora as mediators in trade between Africans and Europeans.[2] Contrastingly, many of the sailors and soldiers who sailed on Couronian Atlantic voyages were recruited from local Baltic and North Sea maritime communities. For example, the first Couronian governor of Tobago, Willem Mollens, appears to have been a veteran of the Amsterdam-to-Windau grain run. [3]



Duke Jakob Kettler at the Jelgava History and Art Museum (image by author).

 

Partnerships for Long-Distance Trade


Widespread collaborations in colonial by the dukes and their representatives planning with foreign merchants and state actors further illustrates the attempts to become better connected. Many of these went far beyond the fortresses in The Gambia and Tobago, encompassing such diverse places as Brazil, the Coromandel Coast of India, Java, and Boston, Massachusetts.


In February 1648, the Couronian envoy to Lisbon gained trading access to Portugal by offering shipbuilding materials, abundant in the eastern Baltic, as well as a loose commitment against Spain. Such guarantees technically negated Courland’s neutrality but had little effect in practice. The Portuguese side refused Couronian requests to open their Asian and Brazilian outposts to foreign ships, however further negotiations in 1650 yielded a compromise. Courland was to rent out its largest ship, Das Wappen der Herzögin, along with its crew, for use in Portugal’s colonial and slaving trade between Lisbon, Africa and Brazil. Two thirds of the cargo was to profit the Portuguese crown, whilst the rest would benefit the Duchy. There is no concrete evidence that such a voyage took place, however, the ship in question is mentioned in Couronian shipping accounts as sailing off the coast of Norway having returned from somewhere called ‘Rio Cruz’ and preparing to head towards Lisbon. [4]


The association the Duke of Courland reached with merchants in Danzig (Polish: Gdańsk) and Hamburg aspired to long-distance trade inland rather than across the sea. Whilst the duchy was at the wrong end of the Baltic for the Atlantic trade, maritime merchants conceived that the Eastern Baltic was an access point for Persian silk via Muscovy. Courland could therefore be resituated at the very centre of a new interface between Europe and the Middle East. The ambitions fell apart in 1646 as Russia remained closed to Couronian envoys in the uncertainty of Tsar Alexei’s minority.[5] The scheme was revived in the 1690s under the impetus of Armenian merchants but soon relocated to Russia after its 1721 victory in the Great Northern War and the construction of St Petersburg.


The slave trade was a further niche with which Courlanders sought to engage. Evidence of successful Couronian shipments of enslaved people to Tobago are rare, but plans encompassing other locations show that they were central to Couronian ambitions. In 1653, for example, the Couronian vessel Leopard sold enslaved Africans in Martinique, a French colony.[6] Two years earlier, Couronian diplomatic representatives offered their Spanish counterparts 1,000 slaves per year. [7] The strategy was similar to English and Dutch attempts to cater for the high demand for enslaved labour in Spanish America. Theoretically, the Couronian ships offered an advantage due to their neutrality (despite the earlier commitment to Portugal), meaning that the trade would not be disrupted by war. Couronian merchants later sent a ship to buy enslaved people in Africa meant for South America in 1658, however it was captured by the WIC before its Atlantic crossing.[8]

 

Navigating Ocean Rivalries


The construction of fortresses in Africa and the Caribbean thrust the duchy onto the oceanic stage. Whilst gaining a more global presence, this relocation left it open to being considered a rival to European powers such as the WIC. Lacking resources and militaristic intent, it was crucial for Couronian officials to establish security and legitimacy by impressing the opposite. Before Couronian ships set sail for Africa in 1651, ducal diplomats appealed to the Dutch States General that they posed no threat, further arguing that Couronian goods would benefit the Dutch as they would mostly be traded in Amsterdam.[9] Likewise, Couronian voyages to Tobago in the 1670s were delayed in order to obtain passports from English and French authorities for safe transit. Representatives regularly emphasised Courland’s neutrality. In London, the ducal envoy argued that Tobago was far better in the hands of a neutral like Courland rather than vulnerable to any of England’s enemies. A memorandum sent to London in 1687 claimed, ‘the said island [Tobago] hath so many avenues for any enemy to enter in and destroy the possessors thereof that it is fit only for a neutral prince who is never concerned in any wars’.[10]



Couronian map of Tobago, 1654, LVVA: 7363, l. 111, fol. 545.


In November 1664, such an approach achieved a breakthrough. Amidst high tensions with the Netherlands, Charles II of England recognised Couronian claims to Tobago, which at that time was inhabited by Dutch settlers. He also granted the Couronian right to trade up to 12,000 pounds a year on the Gambia. [11] The deal was highly influential for Courland’s colonial strategy and subsequent plans incorporated the treaty’s stipulations. For instance, the duke respected the agreement that only English and Couronian settlers could inhabit Tobago by contracting the London merchant, John Poyntz, in 1681 to advertise the island to potential colonists in England. The 1664 agreement was held up as the basis for the relaunch of Courland’s colonial ambitions even to the most unsympathetic of audiences. An expedition landing in Tobago in 1669 told its Dutch inhabitants that the land was Couronian by decree of the English king. In 1699, joint proposals to settle Tobago by Duke Ferdinand and a group of Rotterdam merchants faltered when the Couronian side insisted that the English crown should be the new settlement’s protector.[12]

Unfortunately, from the Couronian point of view, the diplomatic approach gained little further traction and the Courlanders failed to convince other Atlantic actors that they deserved a place in the ocean. The Courlanders frequently drew the ire of French and WIC colonial commanders, who were known to capture Couronian ships if they were deemed to be interrupting their own trade. Couronian settlements on Tobago also fell victim to sustained Amerindian raiding, a response to the disruption the Courlanders caused to important links between the Lesser Antilles and South America which traditionally ran via Tobago.


The 1664 deal was one isolated success but caused consternation from the RAC who refused to let Couronian ships take advantage of their new privileges. The company explained to a royal investigation that ‘the whole trade of the River of Gambia doth not take of Europe commodities to the value of half twelve thousand pounds’, and thus there was no chance of the RAC ever profiting with the Courlanders also in the Gambia.[13] The RAC also cast doubt on Courland’s neutrality, pointing to the heavy Dutch representation in Courland’s African operations. English governors in the Caribbean were also wary, arguing that any close cooperation would contravene the Navigation Acts which banned English colonial imports and exports being carried on foreign ships. Thomas Lynch, governor of Jamaica, stated clearly in his log that a Couronian-governed Tobago would ‘ruin the trade from England’ by flooding Barbados with cheap Dutch goods.[14] Eventually the English government rejected the 1664 agreement, claiming that subsequent treaties between less peripheral powers such as France and the United Provinces, superseded it.

 


Couronian map of St Andreas Island, 1651, LVVA: 7363, l. 111, fol. 553.


Conclusion


The Couronian attempt to de-peripheralise through colonial means eventually fizzled out by 1700 as both money and foreign sympathy drained. The Kettler dynasty was soon to follow, although the duchy itself would survive until 1795. Courland’s oceanic trading history shows a high level of ambitions which not only went far beyond the eastern Baltic, but also the fortresses it briefly held. These aspirations were often dependent on connections to actors beyond Courland’s borders. However, the process of relocation out of the periphery put Courland in a position where it was viewed as disruptive, the very opposite of the original neutral intention.


John Freeman is an assistant professor at the University of Warsaw, working in the Centre for Global History. He has previously worked as a research fellowship at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Baltic Sea Region Research at the University of Greifswald and as a research assistant at the Centre for Geopolitics, Cambridge. His first article ‘The neutral philosophy of the Duchy of Courland in trading and colonial activity from the reign of Jakob Kettler to the turn of the 18th Century’ in Atlantic Studies 20:1, won the best early career essay prize in Atlantic Studies for 2023.


[1] H.F. Morland Simpson and August Seraphim, ‘Civil War Papers’ in Miscellany of the Scottish Historical Society 1 (1893), 141-225.

[2] Otto Heinz Mattiesen, Die Kolonial- und Überseepolitik der Kurländischen Herzöge im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1940), p.181.

[3] Anon, Korte Deductie by Dewelcke Klaerlijk Werdt Betoont Dat Het Eyland van Tobago Gelegen in America Toebehoort Aen Sijn Hoog Vorstelijcke Doorluchtigheyt Jacobus tot Lijflant in Courlant Semgallen Hertogh: Ende Dat de Possessie, Dewlcke de Heeren Lambsins Op Het Geseyde Eylandt Pretendeeren, Geen Fondament En Heeft (Mitau: Michiel Carnali, 1668); Mattiesen, Kolonial- und Überseepolitik, p. 183; Sound Toll Registers Online. https://www.soundtoll.nl./

[4] Contract between Hendrik Momber and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Latvijas Valsts Vēstures Arhīvs, Riga (LVVA): 554, apr. 1, l. 709, fols. 243-244; Mattiesen, Kolonial- und Überseepolitik, p. 242.

[5] Heinz Mattiesen, ‘Die Versuche zur Erschliessung eines Handelsweges Danzig-Kurland-Moskau-Asien, Besonders für Seide, 1640-1655’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 3:4 (1938), 533-567.

[6] ‘State Papers, 1655: April (5 of 6),’ in A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 3, December 1654 - August 1655, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 396-410. British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol3/pp396-410.

[7] Mattiesen, Die Kolonial- und Überseepolitik, pp. 110-112.

[8] Instructions for the officers of the ship Pietas, 30 April 1659, Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NL-HaNA), 1.01.02 Staten Generaal, inv.nr. 5767, scan 90.

[9] Alexandrs Berķis, The History of the Duchy of Courland (Towson, MD: Paul M. Harrod Company, 1969), p. 40.

[10] An impartiall account of the true state of the case concerning the Island of Tobago, 1687, The National Archives, Lonon (TNA), CO 1/62 vol.60., fol. 27.

[11] Treaty between Duke Jakob and Charles II, 17 November 1664, LVVA: 554, apr. 3, l. 6, fols. 81-83.

[12] John Poyntz, The Present Prospect of the Famous and Fertile Island of Tobago with a Description of the Situation, Growth, Fertility and Manufacture of the Said Island, to which is Added Proposals for the Encouragement of All Those that are Minded to Settle There(London: George Larkin, 1683); Letter from Abel Tisso to the State of Zeeland, 16 March 1669, Zeeuws Archief, Middelburg, 2-2035.1 Staten van Zeeland, inv. nr. 120, fol. 1; Comments relating to Courland and Tobago, Stadsarchief Rottrdam, NL-RtGAR: 33-01 Handschriften Verzameling, inv. nr. 3226.

[13] Letter from the Royal Africa Company to Sir Edward Walker, 22 May 1673, TNA: SP 88/15, Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Poland and Saxony fols. 108-109.

[14] Entries relating to Jamaica, 29 August 1682, TNA: CO 138/4, fol. 45v.

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